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One important response to the question in my title is that, of course, everything about 
human nature is natural.  Humans are part of nature and whatever they do is thereby 
natural.  ‘Natural’ here is thought of in contrast to outside or above nature.  God, 
immortal souls, angels, and so on, are the kinds of things I have in mind as lying 
outside of nature. And if, like myself, you are a naturalist in the very minimal sense of 
denying that there is anything outside of a nature (I prefer to call myself an anti-
supernaturalist than a naturalist), then everything is natural.  A fortiori so is human 
nature, whatever it may turn out to be. 
 
This is perhaps a trivial sense of human nature, but it makes a non-trivial point. One 
of the deep problems in discussion of human nature is that this sense, in which only a 
supernaturalist could deny that human nature is part of nature, part of the natural 
world, is never far from the discussion.  What is really at stake in discussions over 
human nature is now more often a quite different sense of ‘nature’, but this first sense 
is often available as a rhetorical device to convict one side in the more serious debate 
of anti-scientific, obscurantist or mystical views.   
 
The more important sense of my question, of course, has to do with a contrast not 
with what is outside nature, but with what is cultural, or artificial; with what is 
produced by the distinctive capacities of human society.  An immediate point about 
this contrast is that it suggests a kind of self-construction of human nature: human 
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nature in the trivial, indisputable, sense is, to some extent anyhow, something that 
humans create.  This may or may not be correct; but the occasional suggestion that it 
is anti-scientific, mystical, etc., is entirely unfounded, based on no more than an 
elementary confusion of the two senses of ‘natural’ to which I have just alluded.   
 
So much for now for the different things that may most generally be contrasted with 
the natural.  What can we say more positively about human nature?  An interest in the 
nature of a kind of thing is an interest in what, by virtue of being a thing of that kind, 
we can expect its properties or behaviour to be.  Thus it is part of the nature of a 
human to have four limbs, two eyes, a heart, a liver, etc.  These characteristics are not, 
however, of any special interest in the human case; it is not with regard to such 
physiological characteristics that humans are often thought to have a nature of a 
different kind from other biological organisms.  Hence human nature is generally 
understood as referring to how humans behave.  And we may even say that it is 
exactly with the question whether human behaviour should be understood in 
essentially the same way as that of any other organism that the controversial issues 
about human nature are involved.  And here also, the accusation that to understand 
human behaviour differently from the behaviour of other organisms is to be anti-
scientific, mystical, or dualistic reflects the confusion of the two senses of ‘nature’ 
mentioned a moment ago.  Whether human behaviour or, that is, human nature, is 
different in kind form that of other animals is a matter of fact, not of logic. 
 
There is another, perhaps less generally recognised, preliminary point that is essential 
to approaching this topic properly.  It is common, when talking about the essence of a 
kind of thing, to imagine something timelessly characterised by a set of distinctive, 
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perhaps essential, properties.  A traditional paradigm of a natural kind is gold—and it 
is perhaps no accident that gold is known for its permanence, its resistance to 
chemical change.  But chemical substances generally have been thought of as existing 
in stable potentially eternal states, and as ceasing to exist when changed into some 
other substance by chemical processes.  Biological substances are not like this.  When 
Aristotle said that Man was a Rational Animal he was no doubt thinking of man as an 
adult human (and of course an adult male human, though that is a topic for a different 
paper).  A human baby is not by any standard a rational animal, and nor even is a 
four-year old human.  Rationality is perhaps an outcome of human development, and 
perhaps it is even a normatively desirable outcome, a telos of human development.  
The vital point is that a human is a process, a series of stages with different 
characteristic properties.  The nature of a human baby is different from the nature of a 
teenaged boy.  If there is something that counts as human nature, it can only be a 
sequence of more specific behaviours characteristic of particular stages in the human 
life cycle. Indeed, the human just is a sequence of such stages.   
 
It is imaginable that the sequence of stages in the human life-cycle could have been a 
fully determinate matter, determined perhaps by the causal properties of the human 
genome.  If this were the case, then the biological and environmental conditions 
necessary for human development would be merely enabling or triggering causes; 
only one life-cycle would be possible given the causal powers of the human genome.  
But we know that nothing like this is true for plants, non-human animals, or even 
bacteria.  It is most certainly not true for humans.  Different environmental conditions 
will produce different development and different sequences of life-stages.  The 
general point is reflected in the concept of ‘norm of reaction’, promoted most forcibly 
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by Richard Lewontin (1974), which specifies the developmental response of an 
organism with a specified genotype to a range of environments, though it is likely that 
this concept is still too narrow to be very useful for the human case. At any rate, the 
point forces rethinking, if not rejection, of the whole issue of the nature of an 
organism, and certainly the nature of a human. 
 
For some organisms it is possible to specify fairly precisely what is their normal 
environment, and hence fairly precisely what is their normal developmental trajectory.  
The extent to which this is so is not simply related to common intuitive conceptions of 
the simplicity or complexity of the organism.  The koala bear, for instance, generally 
considered a higher animal, spends its life eating and sleeping in Eucalyptus trees, and 
that’s about all it does or can do.  That is its developmental environment.  Many 
bacteria, on the other hand, are highly responsive to their environments and can 
engage in quite different chemical activities according to the context, especially of 
other interacting micro-organisms, in which they find themselves.  In fact there is a 
natural tendency, of which the koala is a representative example, for complexity of 
organisation to generate ever more specialised and specific environmental 
requirements.  However some complex multicellular animals (and plants) have 
evolved the capacity to respond with great flexibility to their environments, in part by 
developing differently according to the environment in which they are found, and in 
part by responding intelligently or adaptively to the immediately present environment.  
The first of these elements of flexibility is what is measured by norm of reaction.  
Humans have developed both these elements of flexibility to an exceptionally high 
degree, which is why the concept of norm of reaction is inadequate by itself to 
describe the relation of humans to their various environments. 
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So does this flexibility make the concept of human nature useless?  Claims that it does 
have tended to elicit the reaction that the human is being treated as a tabula rasa 
(Pinker 2002), whereas in fact there are surely some constraints on the possible 
development and behaviour of the human organism.  It would probably be difficult or 
impossible to bring up humans to adopt the kind of sociality found in the social 
insects, for instance.  More relevantly, it seems that humans do not flourish as slaves, 
something that would be difficult to understand if they were entirely developmentally 
plastic.  There is an important political as well as factual point in claiming that such 
social arrangements run counter to human nature and we should not abandon it 
without very careful consideration.   
 
Let me now return to a point I mentioned earlier, that humans construct the 
environments in which human nature develops.  Again, this should not be seen as 
unique to humans.  The elaboration of the concept of niche construction has been one 
of the most significant developments in recent evolutionary biology (Odling-Smee et 
al.2003).  Whereas evolutionary changes were for many years modelled in terms of a 
population adapting itself to a fixed external environment, it has become increasingly 
clear that in the most typical case the state of the environment is equally an effect of 
the activity of the organisms that inhabit and exploit it.  Beavers, to take a familiar 
example, do not merely adapt themselves to living around lake-forming dams; they 
build the dams that form the lakes.  More subtle, and a case that was of great interest 
to Charles Darwin (1882), are the activities of earthworms that create the soil 
conditions that best favour their own thriving and, happily, that of many other plants 
and animals that share their environment.   
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Here, however, we reach the point at which, without venturing into the worlds of 
immaterial souls or vital forces, humans nonetheless depart in a fundamental way 
from the rest of biological nature with which we are familiar; or, perhaps, it is where a 
difference of degree becomes a difference of kind.  The extent to which humans 
construct the environment in which they develop and to which they are more or less 
successfully adapted greatly exceeds in several dimensions anything found in any 
other species.  And this, to refer finally to the official topic of the symposium at which 
this paper was first presented, is where nature confronts technology.  Three features 
most clearly distinguish the human technology that constructs the human environment 
(and for that matter the environment of every other organism on the planet) from other 
examples of niche construction in the biological world. These are diversity, 
intentionality and finally sheer complexity.   
 
Once more it need not be insisted that any of these are totally novel phenomena in the 
human realm.  Remarkable cultural diversity has recently been observed among the 
most intelligent social mammals, such as chimpanzees (Vogel 1999) or social whales.  
A discussion of intentionality would take us far beyond the philosophical reach of the 
present talk, so I will say only that I have no wish to quarrel with the widespread, if 
by no means universal, intuition that the activities of animals through which they 
modify their environments in ways that serve their own flourishing are properly 
described in many cases as intentional.  And complexity is of its nature a matter of 
degree.  Nonetheless taken together we have something that fundamentally 
distinguishes humans from the rest of the biological order.  
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To illustrate my present point, and explore its implications for human nature, let me 
focus for a moment on a very familiar but very recent bit of human technology, the 
mobile phone.  Obviously this is an artefact intended for a particular purpose 
(originally, at least, communication with conspecifics at a distance; no doubt the 
possible uses are currently expanding).  One should hesitate a moment before 
immediately assuming that it is clearly more complex or more focused on an adaptive 
end than anything non-human.  A possible counterexample might be the termite 
mound, which is a remarkably clever structure for provision of space for and 
protection of core activities, thermo-regulation and probably much else.  A minimal 
crucial difference, however, is that the phone is designed rather than evolved.  Its 
development was able to take place in a few years rather than many millions of years.  
And its use is changing at a comparable rate as new functions are added: people 
younger than me use mobile phones for taking and transmitting pictures, capturing 
and playing music, and so on.   Though purely biological evolution may be a lot faster 
than some twentieth century theorists supposed, this kind of rapid creation and 
horizontal transmission of new functions is surely beyond its reach. 
 
But do these rapid changes in technology have any serious impact on human 
development?  My feeling is that we are only tempted to ask this question if we are in 
the grip of a theoretical conviction that the answer must, contrary to appearances, be 
No.  On the face of it it would be extraordinary if children growing up in constant 
interaction with cars, planes, televisions, phones, computers, and so on, all of which 
were rare or non-existent no more than a hundred years ago, were largely unchanged 
by this fact.  Consider again the mobile phone.  Again, I observe as one who did not 
grow up with this convenience.   It seems clear to me that the nature of human 
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sociality has been significantly transformed.  I observe that there is a large group of 
people whose mobile phones are seldom out of their hands and who are typically 
engaged in some kind of communication using it every few minutes.  My experience 
of social space is largely of people in my spatial vicinity.  Of course I am familiar 
with phone calls, letters, and recently emails, that continue social connections when 
these are spatially interrupted, but most of the time I am either on my own or engaged 
with those (physically) around me.  My impression is that this is no longer at all the 
case for serious mobile phone users.  Their circles of friends and acquaintances move 
around with them, though not in physical space, and are engaged with them in 
apparently almost continuous interaction.  Interestingly, the interacting groups are, 
presumably, simultaneously distinct and overlapping.   
 
The cultural disjuncture between the mobile phone and the pre-mobile phone 
generations is most obvious in the distaste caused to the latter by the phone use of the 
former in certain confined spaces, of which trains probably induce the strongest 
conflict.  Pre-mobiles (let me call them) are often outraged by the loud and sometimes 
intimate conversations to which they are unwillingly exposed by the mobiles.  People 
in whose company they are travelling should not, they feel, be engaged in loud 
conversations with people with whom they (the outraged) are not even acquainted.  
What they fail to understand, however, is that from the perspective of the mobiles 
they are almost literally not travelling in their company.  Their companions are the 
usual friends and family who travel everywhere with them, connected by their mobile 
phones.  Though they are, it is true, spatially contiguous with the other people in the 
train compartment, this is a far less salient form of association for the mobiles than for 
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the pre-mobiles, and the annoyance of the latter seems, to the former, unmotivated 
and disproportionate. 
 
It is time to take stock of where we have been in the argument so far.  Organisms in 
general, and humans in particular, to varying extents construct the environments to 
which the sequence of forms into which they develop are adapted.  Or perhaps better, 
the life cycles of organisms in the process of continuing their own and reproducing 
further such life cycles, also construct an environment to which those life cycles are 
suited.  This is a common biological property that humans have taken to a much 
greater degree than other organisms.  Just as the nose is not unique to the elephant, but 
that animal has taken it further, so it is with humans and the construction of 
environments.   
 
It would be an exaggeration at best, and one closely parallel to the point of view I 
shall criticise in a moment, to suggest that technology was generally a Darwinian 
enabling device.  As theorists even of cultural evolution have long argued, cultural 
processes such as the development of technology have their own momentum 
substantially independent of the forces of natural selection acting on their 
implementers.  There is no reason to think that mobile phones increase the 
reproductive success of their users, or mobile phone using societies outreproduce less 
telecommunicative competitors.  But this is no way contradicts my earlier point, that 
mobile phones may very well channel the development of their users in novel 
directions towards novel forms of behaviour and different experiences of the world.  
This, then, is an example of how changes in human development can come about 
through processes quite distinct from the natural selection theorised by traditional 
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evolutionists.  Not a surprise to many, perhaps, but contradicting some influential 
views of contemporary sociobiologists and evolutionary psychologists. 
 
We should also review the question whether such technological enhancements really 
count as part of human nature.  Not every quirk of human behaviour is part of human 
nature, certainly.  The detail may be open to debate, but not the principle.  Mobile 
phones maybe on the boundary of human nature for some parts of the human species, 
but wearing clothes and living in houses have surely crossed that boundary.   These 
are as much a part of human nature now as building dams is part of the nature of 
beavers or webs the nature of spiders.   In these latter non-human cases there is 
variation in the extent to which the behaviours in question are “genetic”, which is to 
say, roughly, produced largely independently of any directly relevant environmental 
variables
1
, or learned, which is to say requiring quite specific and variable external 
inputs to be exhibited.  In the human case, there is no such debate.  Whatever 
behaviours there may be ‘genes for’, using mobile phones is not among them; and 
nor, almost certainly, is wearing clothes.  There is no reason why behaviours acquired 
to some degree through environmental input by all or most of the members of a 
species should not become part of that species nature, and human technology is an 
extraordinarily powerful generator of new behaviours.  Technology, I propose, is a 
process by which human nature undergoes rapid evolution of a kind that has little or 
nothing to do with DNA.  Not the only such process—culture much more generally is 
                                                 
1
 I should emphasise here the word ‘variable’.  All phenotypic traits require inputs from the 
environment for their development.  Many of these require inputs that the environment reliably 
provides and these are often thought of as genetically caused.  These statements are exceedingly rough 
and would require much more work to explain with any rigour.  For a thorough critique of the 
innate/acquired distinction, towards which I am roughly gesturing, see Griffiths  (2002).  If the 
distinction is unsustainable, however, this should strengthen rather than damage my argument. 
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such a process—but perhaps nonetheless one that has accelerated the rate of change of 
human nature to a new level. 
 
But there is a more serious problem in including these kinds of changes within the 
concept of human nature.  This is that human nature is liable to become massively 
fragmented.  The mobiles and non-mobiles just discussed appear to have different 
natures.  Humans in the West will have different natures from humans in rural New 
Guinea.  Perhaps humans in Britain will have different natures from humans in France 
or Germany.  There are compelling concerns about this, both theoretical and practical.  
Theoretically, a central point of the concept of a nature is to distinguishing the nature 
of a thing of a certain kind from whatever else might happen to be true of a particular 
instance of the kind.  But as the nature starts to fragment in the way I have just 
described, this distinction also seems to evaporate in ways that threaten to undermine 
any point in identifying the nature in the first place.  Practically, the idea of human 
nature is often put to vital political use by insisting on its unity.  Many of the worst 
outrages in the history of human conflict and oppression have been justified by claims 
that oppressed or enemy groups had a fundamentally different nature.  One should be 
cautious in staking out a philosophical position that lends support to such arguments.   
 
I shall not, however, attempt to address the practical issue in any detail here.  It does 
seem to me, as a matter of fact, that rigid and deterministic views of human nature 
have been used more often to oppress than to emancipate.  Those who which to 
oppress or discriminate against other groups of humans are anyhow not, I fear, likely 
to be moved one way or the other by philosophical or scientific arguments.  Denying 
the cultural diversity of humans seems too self-evidently implausible to have any 
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point, and that diversity will no doubt provide a sufficient rationalisation for the 
advocate of oppression and discrimination.  The argument that progressive change is a 
waste of time because the human essence is immutable seems to me one more 
seriously worth addressing, and its exposition of the weakness of such positions will 
at least provide one possible practical benefit of the interpretation of human nature 
that I advocate here. 
 
The response to the theoretical point must, once again, be to take seriously the 
question whether we would not do better to abandon the concept of a human nature 
altogether.  I have no strong commitment on this.   However, I think it can be made 
clear enough what is at stake.  One good way of approaching the issue is through the 
recognition that whereas we often think of life in terms of a hierarchy of objects—
molecules, cells, organisms, etc.—we know very well that what we are really dealing 
with is a hierarchy of processes.  A species, what defines the kind to which an 
organism belongs, is an evolving entity.  The species of which an organism is a 
member at a particular time, is a time slice through a changing process the elements of 
which were quite different in the past from how they are now, and which will be quite 
different again in the future.  The organisms which are these species members are 
themselves temporal parts of sequences of developmental stages that also stretch into 
a past in which the elements of the sequence were very different.  If they are very 
lucky, they too may stretch into a similarly different future. 
 
Now, it is clear enough what is meant for elements of a hierarchy of stable things to 
have a nature: in the ancient tradition of specifying the essence of a kind of thing, the 
nature determines what a thing is.  There is of course much more to be said here about 
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different conceptions of essence, and a fundamental divide between real and nominal 
essences, and so on.  But independent of all this, an essence is something without 
which a thing would not be the kind of thing it is and, on most accounts, would no 
longer exist.  No such essence, or nature, seems appropriately attributed to an 
organism, once this is recognised as a process.  If, for example, it were part of the 
nature of a human to be rational, then humanness would keep appearing and 
disappearing in the sequence of life cycles that constitute human life.  Foetuses are 
not rational, and many humans lose rationality as they reach advanced age.  It would 
be absurd to suggest that humanness comes and goes in this way.  The example may 
seem an extreme one, but I hypothesise that similar problems will arise with any 
attempt to offer a substantive and interesting characterisation of human nature.  Even 
if interesting characterisations of human nature can persist throughout the human 
developmental cycle, it seems implausible that they can survive all possible 
evolutionary changes that we would view as consistent with the survival of the human 
species. 
 
It seems that I have concluded that human nature cannot exist after all.  I prefer to say 
that it can exist only if we reconsider what a nature is.  But since the problems that 
arise apply quite generally across the biological world, there is much to be said for 
such a reconsideration.  And in fact the way to do this to take account of life cycles is 
fairly obvious.  One need only say that part of human nature is to be rational-when-
adult or helpless and milk-drinking when new-born, and so on, to avoid the problem.  
In fact a similar relativisation is also already required to take care of the issue of sex: 
it is part of human nature, for example, to be facially hairy when male and past 
puberty, or lactating when female with infant children.  No doubt the obviousness of 
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this kind of modification has distracted attention from any general worries about the 
treatment of a process as an object. 
 
However evolution presents more difficult problems.  (Here, by the way, I use 
“evolution” in a way that is entirely noncommittal on questions about process or rate.)  
One difference between the cases is that whereas the intuition is quite clear that a 
human is a human throughout the life-cycle, it is far from clear that the human species 
is a species of humans throughout its history.  In fact it is widely agreed that most of 
our ancestors were certainly not human.  So when did the first humans appear?  Some 
biologists do have an answer to this, specifically the cladistic school of taxonomy that 
sees species beginning and ending with events of lineage division.  Unfortunately, on 
this view it is likely that the first humans were indistinguishable from the first 
chimpanzees, and creatures that we would definitely classify as apes rather than 
humans.   The general problem is that any attempt to specify precisely what 
constitutes human nature will generate some quite arbitrary historical moment at 
which a particular lineage became the human lineage.  Even worse, it will appear that 
at some transitional stage some organisms in the lineage will be human and others 
will not. 
 
Could we solve the problem just as we solved the problem about life-cycles, by 
defining human nature only at a time?  It seems, in fact, given the problems just 
explained, that this is the only possibility.  Features of organisms that are not subject 
to evolutionary change only achieve this stability by being so deeply engrained in the 
functioning of the lineage that they are certain to be shared by the members of other 
lineages.  It is no doubt harmless to say that it is part of human nature to possess a 
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backbone, but it is not very illuminating.  It is perhaps much more important, because 
occasionally it seems to be forgotten, that we are social animals, but even this does 
not distinguish us from any, or almost any, of our primate relatives.  As we start to 
specify the form this sociality takes, we move to facets of human life and behaviour 
that not only are subject to evolutionary change, but are evidently mutable over 
historical time, and even variable among different local populations.  To take an area 
of behaviour that is generally agreed by evolutionists to be of enormous selective 
importance, such differences are empirically evident in patterns of sexual behaviour.  
There are very large differences among living and historical human populations in 
features such as degree of promiscuity, extent of polygyny or, occasionally, 
polyandry, prevalence and social status or function of homosexuality, and so on.  If 
features of these kinds are the kinds of things that we would want to attribute to 
human nature, this variability will provide a fatal obstacle.     
 
There are, of course, many other features of many that might be considered as central 
to human nature, and I cannot aim to discuss all of them.  However, for now I shall 
tentatively suggest that we should indeed give up the concept of human nature in the 
traditional sense of telling us what is essential, fundamental, most important, etc., 
about humans (and indeed we should give up comparable concepts for other 
organisms).  Rather we should develop a rich, empirical natural history of the human.   
And we should notice that there are major gains as well as losses from this 
acceptance.  While human natural history tells us how humans (typically) develop in 
contemporary circumstances, seeing this as mutable creates the possibility of 
changing those circumstances and, hence, the typical human development.   This is 
not, as critics of the blank slate like to suggest, to present such change as trivially easy 
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to achieve, merely as possible.  It is not trivial because the conditions of human 
development are an almost unimaginably complex mixture of internal and external 
factors, and one that is sufficiently integrated and robust that it does quite regularly 
produce a viable developmental outcome.  Not every arbitrary alteration of this 
developmental matrix will be effective, nor will it always have the effect intended.  
Nevertheless, the possibilities of such alteration are something about which a rich 
body of empirical evidence has been accumulated, and we certainly do not need to 
accept the conservative pessimism of believers either in immutable human nature or 
wholly inscrutable human developmental processes.   
 
The realisation of the role of technology in human evolution provides a new and 
fascinating twist to our understanding of these possibilities.  As I have indicated, I 
think that human technology has fundamentally altered human evolution.  Consider, 
for instance, a function which is an essential part of the characterisation of any 
animal, its mobility.  Prior to technology humans were fairly slow animals.  But 
bicycles, cars, skateboards, jet aircraft, trains, the construction of roads, and so on 
have entirely transformed this capacity so that, in the right circumstances humans 
have far greater mobility than any other animal.  They also have extremely diverse 
mobility.  Some people in poor countries have little more mobility than their pre-
technological ancestors.  But most have some more, and some have much more.   
 
While no one doubts the increase in capacity, many I suspect will find it strange to 
call this evolution.  But why?  Presumably because technology is seen somehow as 
not part of nature, and nature is the realm in which evolution operates.  Once again we 
should recall that we have no such qualms with other creatures.  Beavers evolved their 
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dam-building tendencies, and with it acquired all kinds of capacities that enabled a 
particular way of life.  Termites would be sorry creatures without their mounds, or 
bees without their hives.  But somehow we are strongly tempted to think quite 
differently about human technology.  I want to say that this is just a relic of dualism:  
human culture and technology is a perfectly natural phenomenon that evolved like any 
other aspect of the biological.  This is not to say that it is not unique in many ways, 
and ways that we should also be comfortable with exploring.   
 
There is a school of thought that will be particularly hostile to the suggestions I have 
been making, and with which many here will no doubt be familiar.  I refer to 
evolutionary psychology
2
.  Evolutionary psychologists argue that humans are adapted 
by evolution to the world of the Pleistocene, or late Stone Age.  This atavistic theory 
is necessitated by the argument that evolution, held to work by the selection of genes 
that build adaptive structures, is much too slow for humans to have adapted to the 
rapid changes that have taken place in recent human history.  The termites, by 
contrast, evolved their mounds at the proper speed, coevolved with them, in fact, and 
are as much at home in them as fish in water.   The curse of the human is to have 
created an alien environment for ourselves, one in which we can never be at home 
unless, perhaps, we make lonely pilgrimages to the African savannah.   
 
This is a strange view.  We are presently by far the most successful large animal on 
the planet (we’ve killed most of the others) and it is curious to hold that this is despite 
our profound maladaptation.  But it is anyhow an indefensible view.  There is much 
wrong with evolutionary psychology, and I and others have catalogued its 
                                                 
2
 See Barkow et al., 1992.  My critical evaluation of this school of thought is elaborated in Dupré 2001. 
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epistemological sins in the past.  Here, however, it is enough to point to its failure to 
recognise the coevolution of organism and niche.  The picture assumed by 
evolutionary psychology is of evolution from the inside (genetic selection) matching 
the organism to a fixed and determinate outside (the ‘environment’).  Genetic 
selection is seen as a very slow process, in which one adaptively advantageous 
mutation at a time must take a number of generations to spread through the 
population.   If the environment changes too fast for this process to catch up, even if it 
is the organism itself that causes the changes, the organism becomes maladapted.  But 
evolution is a more efficient process than this picture suggests.  Organisms change 
their environments in ways that are adaptive, and in part they do this by developing, 
using both internal and external resources, in ways that leave them adapted to the 
environments they in part construct.  Humans only do this more spectacularly than 
other organisms and with the growth of technology they probably do it much faster
3
.  
Evolutionary psychologists like to say that culture is no more than one more 
Darwinian enabling device.  I’m inclined to agree, but also to add that it enables a 
rather different kind of Darwinism. 
 
So where does all this leave human nature?   The safe response is to insist that there is 
no such thing.  It is not that humans have no natures at any time, as the much parodied 
blank slate view is taken to suggest.  But since human nature is generally understood 
as something fixed, common to all humans past, present and to come, this 
misapprehension can best be avoided by denying that there is any such thing.  I prefer, 
however, to take up the challenge of construing the search for human nature as the 
search for the best characterisation available of what humans are like.  Humans, we 
                                                 
3
 Faster, at any rate, than other multicellular organisms with long generation times.  The techniques by 
which microbes construct and adapt to their environments are rather different, and are fascinating and 
important.  But they must await another occasion.   
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have seen, are Protean and malleable.  Not only individually, but as a species, they 
can quickly come to adapt themselves to rapidly changing circumstances.  That 
humans can thrive in rainforest and deserts, tropics and tundra, is itself enough to 
indicate the versatility of the species.  This is hardly unique, however.  Rats and 
seagulls, for instance, are almost as good at adjusting to the range of terrestrial 
climates and geographies.  But humans are unique in their capacity to create 
environments that not only permit them to survive, but permit them to thrive.  And 
thriving here does not merely mean staying alive and producing offspring, but 
includes providing opportunities, often, for doing things that they do for enjoyment.  
No doubt, again, it is also the curse of the human species that as well as a unique 
capacity for satisfying desires they have a unique capacity for creating them: human 
desire is, perhaps literally, insatiable (Gagnier 200).  But whether it is a blessing or a 
curse, it is a respect in which human existence is quite unlike that of other organisms. 
 
I don’t want to say whether the ability to create the environment of their adaptation is 
more or less fundamental in characterising human uniqueness than the other 
traditional attributes, such as language, rationality, culture, technology, and suchlike.  
Of course these are all related.  Culture is perhaps just a name for the environment 
that humans construct for themselves, and technology a name for some of its most 
empowering aspects; language is certainly one of the necessary conditions for this 
construction, facilitating among other things the division of labour that makes 
possible complex social projects; and whatever rationality is, it is intended to name 
part of the intellectual capacity that makes all of this possible.  
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However, the focus on construction of, and rapid adaptation to, environments does 
have one particular virtue.  It illuminates both the continuity of the distinctively 
human with the non-human—there is nothing unique about the construction of one’s 
environment—and also the difference, since no other creature has comparable 
resources or abilities for changing the circumstances in which it develops and lives.  
Moreover, as I have also emphasised here, the capacity of humans to change the 
circumstances of their development has come to be a dominant force in human 
evolution, allowing evolution to occur at a rate unknown in other animals and even, to 
some degree, under the control of the evolving population.  Though the human 
experiment may prove to be a brief one it is, at present, an astonishingly successful 
one.  The evolutionary psychologists’ contention that we are the maladapted 
possessors of an atavistic psychology, quite generally unsuited for the world we have 
created, is a ridiculous one.  For all these reasons, I am inclined to see this feature of 
the human species as, if anything is, its defining characteristic, as human nature.  We 
are, one might say, the Technological Animal. 
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